The claim that '68 was global has become axiomatic. How so, for whom, with what impact? Scholars have productively pursued two scales of analysis: grassroots and geopolitical. While student movements have been the premier instance of the more socio-cultural scale, seldom has their mobilization been analyzed vis-à-vis the ostensibly more macro scale of suprastate entitie. Intermediaries between these sectors, leaders of major universities occupied an acutely uncomfortable, pivotal place. Through historical analysis based on archival research (on the biographies of university administrators, student movements, and media debates) the Global 1968 is here considered from the perspective of higher education administrators at elite universities of capitalist empire in the mid-twentieth century at metropoles/global cities -London and New York -and semi-periphery nodes -Bloomington (Indiana, USA) and Mexico City. For such elites, consternation over the turmoil of 1968 constituted a kind of global moral panic when universities presidents found themselves the objects of intense pressures on multiple fronts: from students, to relinquish much authority, and at the same time, from fellow elites and much of the public, to forcefully discipline students. In juxtaposing brief biographies of these university presidents, we highlight the experiences and visions of the global that these men brought to the table, in relation to the pressures that they faced from student movements on their campuses as well as from political powers and the general public. These multi-scaler pressures constituted 1968 as a global phenomenon and put administrators squarely on this conjunctural hot seat.
Modernizing the Cold War University
In the aftermath of World War II, university presidents and rectors had been specifically charged with modernizing their institutions along the lines of Modernization Theory (Rostow, 1960; Gilman, 2004) . Modernization put universities at the service of so-called public interest in a global political economy (Fletcher, 1968; Dent, 1961; Ross, 1966; Denis, 1973; Winston, 1972; Rohstock, 2012) . To create a new technocratic and administrative class, modernization required the expansion of enrollment beyond the children of the elite (Billingsley, 2003) , bringing into closer contact young people from different backgrounds, thus making university campuses sites of multiple crossings of class, race, religion, national origin, and gender boundaries; interactions fostered in classrooms, at dances, and in other meeting spaces led to political constituencies, friendships, and even dating across heretofore prohibited lines (Dennis & Kaufmann, 1966) .
More to the point, these crossings created the spark from which vibrant student movements emerged to both challenge university ties to -what U.S. President Dwight Eisenhower had dubbed-the «military-industrial-complex» and posit alternative globalities that connected scales of conflict: from neighborhoods to campuses, from the offices and boardrooms of elite power to plantations, mines, and battlefields across the globe. While University of London student Fred Halliday urged «Students of the World [to] Unite», Columbia students justified occupying buildings by «call [ing] (notably, Grewal and Kaplan 1999) who demonstrate the fungibility (Brady 2000) of those categories, especially in processes of late capitalist globalization (Tsing 2000) .
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e-ISSN: attention to the unconscionable violence in Vietnam, the police state in Harlem, and the intolerable oppression by the United States in Latin America» (Hook, 1970, p. 77; Gorovitz & Goodman, 1967) .
The highly-charged description of student movement grievances opened counter-revolutionary Professor Sidney Hook's chapter, «The Attack on Academic Freedom». He delineated these grievances, even as he proceeded to dismiss activists' anti-racist and anti-imperialist commitments as mere pretexts for hooliganism on campus. Flagging students' use of vulgarity, he charged that «One of the curious consequences of the threats to academic freedom by rampaging militant activists of the SDS [Students for a Democratic Society] and Black Nationalists has been the efforts of administrators to purchase peace at any price by sacrificing essential principles of academic freedom» (Hook, 1970, p. 88 ). Hook's vehement comments exemplify the moral outrage student movements incited from whom activists termed «the establishment». This public clamored for universities to punish ungrateful activists. Consequently, Hook derisively observed that «The life of an administrator in our times is an unhappy one» (1970, p. 89) .
We sketch four university cases to expose the unhappy predicaments of these administrators -as leaders with extensive prior global experience, as such-and how they tried to maneuver under these pressures. Largely supportive of students' right to protest, but against strident tactics and invective, administrators frequently employed draconian measures to weaken movements and retake the discursive and physical campuses. Some, like Columbia's Kirk and IU's Stahr, resigned under the unrelenting pressure; others, such as Wells, persevered as they worked to resolve demands coming from all sides. Despite differing positions of their universities within the system of capitalist empire, all presidents found themselves having to mediate multiple scales of conflict. Administrators' framings of this global predicament and ultimate decisions on how to handle student unrest -frequently broadcast and scrutinized across national and international media-were indicative of an elite global panic that was growing as the movements themselves flourished.
Columbia Faces the Nation: «things do perhaps at times tend to get out of hand»
The student revolt at Columbia University was and has remained one of the most quintessential of U.S. '68. For our purposes here, it usefully encapsulates the amalgam of local-national-global scales of struggle that made 68 so vexing for «the establishment»: synchronous and asynchronous protests, including the occupation of campus buildings, highlighted Columbia's colonialist relationship with its Harlem neighbors; this relationship was epitomized by plans to usurp some of a nearby public park to build a new student gym, the grievances of students of color, antiVietnam War demonstrations, and protests over faculty contributions to U.S. warmaking in Southeast Asia and imperialist interventions in multiple parts of the worlds (Bradley, 2010; Farrell, 2013; Boren, 2013) .
The university president under whose watch this all exploded was Grayson Kirk. Kirk had served as interim president for two years during WWII, when then-Columbiapresident Dwight Eisenhower (Ike) left to command NATO; he then took over the post over for seventeen years once Ike became President of the United States. Kirk's mandate was one shared by many higher education administrators of the era: to «modernize» the university by making it more directly serve the strategic interests of business and state. While the prior university mandate had been to reproduce a ruling class of gentle-men -along with a subordinate set of gentle-men from provinces, colonies, and dependent states-by inculcating liberal arts knowledge, by mid-twentieth century, universities were to directly incorporate certain individuals from formerly excluded groups, including women, and to prepare them with the technological skills needed by business and state. Universities had become key elements in what was then framed (famously by Ike) as a military-industrial complex necessary for this new superpower to fight a global Cold War. Indeed, Kirk and other Columbia faculty of the School for International Affairs were doing research on Vietnam for the Institute for Defense Analyses (the IDA, on whose board Kirk sat, was founded in 1956 in Alexandria, Virginia, to run federal think tanks). Prior to the Columbia presidency, Kirk was integrally involved in the formation of the United Nations Security Council, having attended the Dumbarton Oaks Conference and the United Nations Conference on International Organization where the United Nations Charter was signed.
Kirk's ability to fulfill this Cold War mandate was boisterously impeded by the amalgam of student groups who, in April 1968, occupied Columbia's campus, including his own office. An iconic '68 image, published in newspapers around the world, centers student agitator David Shapiro, decked out in dark sunglasses and seated defiantly with feet up on Kirk's desk, smoking a cigar. Dominant media commentary on the image, in the U.S. and the U.K. excoriated students, including anti-Semitic derision for Shapiro (as with France's Daniel Cohn-Bendit), and chose to miss the image's carnivalesque commentary on the ways in which university research on behalf of the C.I.A. and defense industry had turned university officers into goons.
In our research in the Columbia archive, we found piles of letters from an outraged public; some appreciated Kirk's predicament, others berated him as weak, but all exhorted him to forcefully discipline student protestors. This public repeatedly emphasized Columbia's special role nationally; thus, Kirk's duty to uphold discipline was seen as a national one. He faced similar pressure when he appeared on national television, on May 5, 1968, on the CBS Sunday morning news show, Face the Nation. There he defended his decision to bring 1000 baton-wielding police to clear the campus, a decision that led to numerous student injuries. «Obviously» he lamented, «in a large operation of this kind, things do perhaps at times tend to get out of hand… If, as I am told, many bystanders and spectators were injured or were arrested or otherwise involved, I am deeply apologetic about it. It was not our plan» (quoted in the Columbia Spectator, 2018) . Kirk then proceeded to blame the older generation for raising the students without proper respect for laws and rules. He concluded by declaring on national television that he had no plans to resign. Four months after this interview, however, he did. The events at Columbia generated a national investigation, published in paperback, by the Cox Commission, named for Archibald Cox, famous for later investigating President Richard Nixon (The Cox Commission, 1968 (Cordier & Maxwell, 1967, p. vi.) . Trained as a medieval historian, Cordier's postdoc in Switzerland (1930-31) cut his teeth in international relations as he surveyed conflicts in the Sudentenland, Danzig, the Chaco. Cordier had been one of founding staff members of the United Nations and was particularly close to United Nations Secretary General Dag Hammarskjöld, serving as his executive assistant as he had for the very first Secretary General (Lie) entailing -according to his obituary (NYTimes, 13 July 1975)-acting as U.N. parliamentarian, supervisor of the 3500 staff members, and overall «troubleshooter» from 1945 -1962 (Cordier, 1967 . Cordier was accused, by the Soviets, of running a shadow regime within the United Nations, which led to his resignation and subsequent employment at Columbia University. At the U.N., one of his special projects (along with the Korean War and the Suez Canal crisis) had been quelling dissent in the former Belgian colony of the Independent Democratic Republic of Congo; there, he likely had material involvement in the CIA-assisted coup that assassinated decolonial Prime Minister, Patrice Lumumba (1961) and installed Mobutu Sese Seko's dictatorship, one that last nearly the duration of the Cold War. Uranium from Congolese mines had been used to make the bombs dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. African natural resources had to be kept under the control of U.S. and pro-US actors. Cordier (1962) this geopolitical intrigue and violence for the Ivory Tower of Columbia to serve as Dean of the School of International Affairs.
Cordier took over as university president in 1968. The New York Times noted that the Columbia «situation seemed as violent and intractable as any upheaval Dr. Cordier had had to deal with in the Middle East or the Congo. Realizing that restoring the peace would require a man of very special talents, the university turned to Dr. Cordier… the two-year interregnum under his very active stewardship isolated [student] radicals, calmed the campus, reopened communications and restored Columbia's position among the great institutions of higher learning». For their part, students responded to his appointment as university president with «chants of 'Hey, hey, Cor dee yay, assassin for the C.I.A». -referring to their allegations, denied by him, that he had had ties to the Central Intelligence Agency». He instituted in an open-door policy, sought opportunities to engage with students, and sympathized with student opposition to the Vietnam War. Columbia University ultimately awarded him its highest medal for «creating a more harmonious campus» (New York Times, November, 13, 1970 Planning (1963 Planning ( -1970 . The IIEP narrates its own founding thus: «The 1950s and 1960s witnessed sweeping transformations throughout the world, from the European reconstruction to the development of newly independent states, all having huge implications for education». Noting that education was recognized as a human right in 1948, this official history marks another seachange: «during the post-war years, states also came to consider the strong nexus existing between education and economic growth; education became regarded an investment for national advancement». This role in national development in a global context, then, was the genesis for a new field: educational planning, «Coupled with an overwhelming increase in popular demand for education, these factors gave birth to the field of educational planning, on which high expectations were placed». Education would concomitantly bolster the global importance of UNESCO by, «bridging gaps among international institutions concerned with the field of educational planning, while at the same time enhancing UNESCO's leading role in education and exploring new policy research topics» (International Institute for Educational Planning, nd., 59). In short, we might say that Caine, a trained economist, pioneered an understanding of education as a global endeavor on a global scale.
The last years of Caine's term as LSE Director coincided with the crescendo of student activism. LSE became a key node for the British '68 and beyond, as activists protested nuclear proliferation, the Vietnam War, and the technocratic restructuring -dubbed modernization-of British higher education, among other pressing issues (Day, 2018; Hoefferle, 2012; Fowler, 2008; Rodriguez-Amat & Jeffery, 2017) . That LSE served as a nexus for a thoroughly global '68 was partly instantiated in the international cast of characters who served in formal student leadership positions (unlike at Columbia, where leaders came from broader civil rights movements, such as SDS and the U.S. Mau Mau movement). The LSE Student Union president was a South African-Jewish exile, David Adelstein (Adelstein, 1968) , who understood the relationship of student activism to broader, global process in relation to which «Britain is the last industrial country to begin to technocratize its higher education», making conflict «more extreme than has been experienced elsewhere» (Adelstein, 1969, p. 59; Denis, 1973; Todaro, 2018; Jones, 2016) . The Graduate Student Association president, also Jewish, was U.S. so-called draft-dodger Marshall Bloom 6 . The hiring of Sir Walter Adams was the lightening rod that fused local, national, and global scales of struggle because of the ways in which Adams incarnated the ongoing globality of capitalist empire. An LSE alum, Adams had worked since 1952 to establish the University of Rhodesia (now the University of Zimbabwe; Mlambo, 1995; Patel, 1981) . Adams had been forced to resign as head of the Rhodesian university by a student strike (Gelfand, 1978; Hodgkinson, 2018; Mutowo & April, 2012) . While LSE had experienced student unrest prior to his hiring, things kicked into high gear when, in 1967, Adelstein and Bloom were suspended for encouraging and taking part in protests against his appointment, especially after a worker died of a heart attack in the midst of student protesting. In reaction, students initiated Espacio, Tiempo y Educación, v. 6, n. 1, enero-junio / january-june 2019, pp. 63-86.
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Unrest again took center stage in 1968, in reaction to a step-up in the Vietnam War. With a demonstration planned for three days later and preoccupied that students would take over the university and shut it down in, on October 24, Adams preemptively closed the university for the weekend. While this measure was designed to ward off any turbulence catalyzed by demonstration, his decision usurped established protocol in acting without faculty support, and the move elicited strong student and faculty reaction; more than 3000 students occupied the campus, with much faculty approval. During the occupation, students organized teach-ins and discussion; they policed the campus and forbid unsanctioned visitors; they set up a kitchen and a medical unit. On Sunday, many left for the anti-Vietnam march, chanting «London, Paris, Rome, Berlin. We will fight and we will win». Students return to the occupied campus afterward and remained through Sunday night, the length of Adams' closure.
Months later, rebellion reignited when students once again shut down the university. Adams had installed security gates to wall off the university from both outside turmoil and, more importantly, future student occupations. The gates did not produce the intended effect. On January 24, 1969, and frustrated with authorities' moves, young activists «'smash[ed]…the gates.'» Armed with iron bars, they broke them down (Mair, 2003) . Two activists were expelled and forbidden from setting foot on campus for life. Not long after, the «Free LSE» campaign was organized, this time in reaction to Adams's suspension of two activist lecturers. The radical tradition of the Union continued through the 1970s.
LSE students had been protesting since 1966, over the course of world affairs, especially, South African apartheid and the Vietnam War. Like students at University of California, Berkeley, and elsewhere, they advocated for «student power» and against what they termed «pedagogic gerontocracy». As activist Colin Crouch put it decades later, «We resented the exercise of authority and power without participation and believed that we could assert that demand without fear» (Mair, 2003) . For students, Adams and his imperial past symbolized that unwanted authority and power.
Indiana University: «Peace and True Progress»
At universities in the middle of a country newly arrived as a world power, there was no respite from the kinds of challenges to authority facing administrators at Columbia and LSE; yet most sought different solutions. Similarities were based on cross-fertilization of ideas and strategies between campuses; but they also emanated from the structural relationships that tied universities to the federal apparatus. After World War II, the U.S. government poured millions of dollars into research at, and the expansion and modernization of, large flagship public institutions to meet the growing population of college students (especially veterans using military benefits) and ward off chances of another depression. Herman Wells began this expansion in earnest with a concomitant move to internationalize the student body, in the latter half of his official term (1962-1968; 1968-2000) , in addition to his office terms as university president-had worked in the U.S. State Department's Office of Foreign Economic Cooperation and as part of the U.S. Military Government of West Germany, and as a delegate and minister, respectively, to the United Nations and government of Pakistan. Yet these men were formed in profoundly different arenas of the global, differences that mattered to their understanding of and approach to student-administrator conflicts, and how the conflicts weighed on them -Stahr resigned from exhaustion, while Wells seemed to, if not flourish, then find a way to live with the pressures. While Stahr was reared in an imperialistic global (i.e., most pronounced in his position of U.S. Secretary of the Army), Wells' global was based on international exchange and intellectual dialogue, with the university as its heart. His vision -cooperation and parity-was the kind promoted by the United Nations, and he committed himself to participating in and promoting its educational organizations. Modernization, then, would instill university principles of discourse and discussion as key to not just all U.S. interactions (domestic and international), but those of the world. For Wells, these principles would structure higher education international exchanges, pushing U.S. campuses beyond a U.S-imperial focus and educating U.S. students for the cooperative world.
IU students called attention to IUs military-industrial-complex ties and denounced US interventions into sovereign countries, which they could not miss with news of the Vietnam War displayed daily in newspaper images and graphic TV footage. They considered the presence of the state on campus an overreach into the inviolable space of the university (Wynkoop, 2017; Shaw, 2012; Lieberman, 2004) . Unlike their contemporaries at Columbia and LSE, Stahr and especially Wells had a reading of the source of students' protests that would push them to pursue different paths to resolution.
Initially, IU administrators weren't particularly alarmed by student condemnations of state-university alliances. Wells remarked that he had dealt with demands from right-wing students early in his IU tenure; these students had expressed their convictions within the accepted bounds of university decorum and academic freedom. And both presidents saw these young protestors as in need of tutelage into the society's norms. Though in loco parentis (in place of the parent) was no longer the framework for dealing with students, these presidents still recognized students' youthfulness and inexperience; and sought to model more decorous behavior in their interactions. They were initially willing to give them the benefit of the doubt -these engaged students meant well, they just didn't know how to behave. And it was administrators' duty to teach them and bring them into a community of scholars and intellectuals. When their time-worn strategies failed to redirect students into fruitful discussion, Stahr became disillusioned and forlorn and left IU to run the Audubon Society, far from the vitriolic cacophony of campus; Wells, bewildered but not alarmed, returned to the helm (Capshew, 2012) .
However, when students started picketing events, the atmosphere raised presidents' fears. In 1967, for example, Stahr allowed recruiters from Dow Chemical onto campus to interview prospective employees. Activists, incensed about their presence, protested, at one point pushing through the doors to the building where recruiters were meeting with students. Outnumbered, officers from IU's Department of Safety Administration called for the Bloomington (Indiana) Police, who came in, beat up a few protestors, and arrested a handful more. While Stahr was unnerved by the response of the police, he was also upset by students' refusal to discuss matters and rejected their calls to subsequently deny entry to military vendors or similar interests -he wouldn't discuss anything with those not adhering to university norms of dissent and intellectual engagement. Administrators received overwhelming support for this approach from university trustees and the Indiana taxpayers. Letters to Stahr and Wells lobbed terms like «delinquents», «hoodlums», and «communists» at protestors and implored IU administrators to discipline their non-student-like behavior.
Stahr's administration, for example, contended with, what is termed, «the Little 500 Sit-in» (Wynkoop, 2018) . On Friday, May 8, 1968 (just over a month after the assassination of civil rights leader Martin Luther King), about fifty African American IU students barricaded themselves inside the stadium where the Little 500, a fourperson bike relay race heavily supported by fraternities and modeled after the Indianapolis 500», was to be held the next day. The group, headed by an IU basketball player and the Afro-Afro-American Students Association and IU basketball player Kenny Newsome, sought removal of clauses in the national charters of IU fraternities that discriminated against African and African American students. These activists announced that they would prevent the Little 500 from starting until all fraternities involved proved that they either had removed such clauses from their charters or would no longer honor them. Though armed with sticks and shields, students refrained from violence for the entire three day sit-in. Stahr, still chafing from the antiDow Chemical protests, took a different approach; he pressured involved fraternities to comply with activists' demands, which all but one did.
Administrators did not begin their terms with upheaval on their minds. In fact, Stahr entered his tenure in 1962 optimistic in what the future would bring. He envisioned education as key to bringing «peace and true progress» to the world (Stahr, 1962 ). Yet he also recognized that the country and the world had entered a moment of «transition». We must «defend…our progress and our hopes for more progress in science, in education, in culture, in human rights, and in free institutions». He likewise warned against too much, too rapid, or the wrong kind of change; for him, the university was essential to the right transition -it would enable progress and thwart unwanted change. Stahr saw student protesting as a sign that change was running amok. Exhausted from attempting to contain the disorder, in 1968, he resigned his post. Herman Wells, who had yielded IU's presidency to Stahr, took over when his predecessor, exhausted and demoralized, left; and he largely continued Stahr's approach to unrest, navigating adroitly between discipline and conciliatory pressure for student-advocated change. Wells cemented a holistic approach to the underlying issues, creating institutional supports for diversity, namely the Groups Program for under-represented domestic students, and reinforcing IU's commitment to international students and research on the widest array of languages and cultures, arguably, of any university in the United States (Capshew, 2012 , Bottoms, 2016 , Gallimore, 2018 . He brought campus unrest to a degree of respite and then handed over the reins to the next president a few months later. Wells didn't leave however; he returned to his position as IU's first chancellor, one he held until his death in 2000.
UNAM Autonomy, 1968 Olympics, and the Showcasing of the socalled Mexican Miracle
Like the other administrators, Javier Barros Sierra, rector of Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México, faced with dire challenges (Solano and Comesaña, 2008) . His situation was similar, moreover, because prior to his appointment as rector in 1966, he had worked in high political echelons. More than any of the others, Barros Sierra was born into prominence as the grandson of an UNAM founder. Having studied engineering there, honing political skills as a student leader, he went on to a professorship and a position as director of the National Preparatory School and the UNAM School of Engineering. By the early 1960s, he was working at the center of national power, as Secretary of Public Works (increasing Mexico's highway system by 58%), and vying -behind the scenes, as this was how the de facto singleparty presidentialist system worked-among a field of intense contenders for the presidency. While his bid for president was not realized, his yeoman-service and loyalty earned the coveted position as rector of the preeminent university in Latin America. Barros Sierra's political career, up until '68, was that of a technocratic party loyalist. He was integral to a political party that had anointed itself the institutional incarnation of the Revolution of 1910, a revolution that had unseated his own grandfather as Secretary of Education and Fine Arts. In 1968, then, Barros-Sierra would epitomize the paradoxes of midcentury Mexico. Yet, his relationship to UNAM was more complex, tying together scales of the intimate, the familial, and the national. Not only was UNAM his family patrimony; his prior rivalry with President Díaz Ordaz made his defense of its autonomy and an intellectual space personal and national.
Rectorship placed Barros Sierra on a global stage because of Mexico's geopolitical position: both a model for modernization and for asserting national sovereignty vis-à-vis capitalist imperialism. His political formation as a student leader (1936-38 student-body president of the Faculty of Sciences and its representative to the university-wide student council) coincided with Mexico's world international relations leadership in recognizing the Soviet Union and Revolutionary Cuba, supporting the Spanish Republic and, most audaciously, President Lazaro Cardenas' 1938 nationalization of all petroleum, overwhelmingly held by U.S. and British oil companies. Barros Sierra had even headed Mexico's Petroleum Institute before he was poached for the rectorship.
Barros Sierra, like most of Mexico, had regarded 1968 as a climactic moment for the nation. As the first so-called third-world country to host the Olympics, they expected the event to showcase the state-promoted development project known as the «Mexican Miracle» of rapid industrialization and urbanization, and to announce Espacio, Tiempo y Educación, v. 6, n. 1, enero-junio / january-june 2019, pp. 63-86.
e-ISSN: to the world the country's long-anticipated arrival as a modern nation-state (Zolov, 2004; Hartmann, 2003; Hamilton, 2011; Pensado, 2014; Pensado, 2013 ) -another key opportunity for Mexico defy U.S. capitalist imperialism and assert itself as a spokes-country for Latin America and the so-called Third World.
Student unrest began in late July 1968, with a rumble between students from two different vocational schools. This fight was brutally broken up by the police, who chased students back into their schools and beat anyone in their path, including teachers trying to calm the situation. Marchers from the Instituto Politécnico, another vocational school, reacted strongly to the police violence and subsequently protested the incident through a march; along the way, they met up with (mostly university-age) demonstrators celebrating the July 26th anniversary of the Cuban Revolution. The two demonstrations merged in the center of the city and met further police brutality. A broader front formed to challenge the authoritarian workings and abuses of the government.
The following days brought more clashes between police and students. The military retaliated, attacking the principal entrance of a college preparatory school. In protest, Javier Barros Sierra, the rector of the country's principal public institution, Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México (UNAM), lowered the university's flag to half-staff. Students at UNAM, the Politécnico, and many smaller (both public and private) educational institutions and secondary schools declared a strike and demanded consequences for state aggressors. Each school and each department within the national university sent two students to serve on the newly formed Comité Nacional de Huelga or strike committee, a body of about two hundred representatives. The students received support from various trade unions, especially the railway workers' and teachers' unions, who themselves had experienced recent confrontations with the state.
From July through October 1968, nearly half a million students engaged in leafleting, street theater, publishing propaganda, small-group public discussions, and, along with other supporters, large-scale street demonstrations. Initially their demands were contained: the repeal of the penal code that made possible the imprisonment of those attending meetings of three or more people; the disbanding of the tactical police force; freedom for political prisoners; the dismissal of the police chief and deputy; the identification of those officials responsible for the initial police attacks and repression; and the agreement of the President to a meeting with student leaders to resolve the demands. Yet even these demands struck too close to the heart of the state's authoritarian tendencies. The government responded by sending the military to occupy UNAM and the Politécnico, desperately seeking to re-impose public order before the opening of the Olympics in mid-October.
As police reaction increased, so too did the vitality of the movement. On the evening of October 2, over ten thousand protestors rallied peacefully in the Plaza de las Tres Culturas or Plaza of Three Cultures -Spanish, Indian, and Mexican (also referred to as Tlatelolco). Shots rang out and people went running for cover. The crossfire between rival military, police, and other security forces ensued. While the state acknowledged only a handful of deaths, unofficial totals reached upward of seven hundred. In addition to the dead and wounded, almost three thousand leaders and activists were rounded up and taken to a military camp for interrogation.
e-ISSN: They were summarily tried, and three hundred were imprisoned in the city's hulking nineteenth century penal structure, Lecumberri prison, some remaining until mid-1971. With much of the leadership cast into prison or fleeing into exile, the movement regrouped, pushed underground. Some activists joined the urban guerilla movements of the early 1970s that were brutally extinguished in a brief and effective dirty war. Many women turned their attention toward the fight for women's liberation that was also occurring in the United States, France, and other places, and started women's organizations and projects. Others would renew their activism only after the 1985 Mexico City earthquake and the subsequent emergence of a viable opposition party to the still entrenched PRI. The president at the time of the 1968 movement, Gustavo Díaz Ordaz (who, six years earlier, had been Barros Sierra's triumphant rival for the Presidency), shouldered most of the political fallout for the violence at Tlatelolco, even as the political system closed ranks and did not reopen until Mexico faced recession in the mid-to-late 1970s and imminent bankruptcy in the early 1980s, when it began absorbing a number of the '68 leaders. During UNAM's Barros Sierra administration, the government violated a sacred premise of the university. The «autónoma» (autonomous) in its (and most Mexican state universities') name was taken seriously by the university itself and the state, and challenging this norm was akin to high treason (Barros Sierra, 1972) . Protesting this violation, along with specific police and military violence against his UNAM's students, Barros Sierra declared a state of mourning at the university. He spoke to a mass rally on the day he declared mourning, 30 July 1968: «University community: Today is a day of mourning for the University. Autonomy is gravely threatened… [it] is not an abstract idea: it is a practice that should be seen as respectable and be respected by all». Then, on August 1 st , he led a massive march on the national capital, The March in Defense of University Autonomy, where he demanded the freedom of university members taken prisoner and the «cessation of repression» (Cronica de Oaxaca 1968 , 31 July 1968 ). Yet the police remained. Refusing to serve under conditions of military occupation, Barros Sierra resigned on September 23 -nine days before the Tlatelolco massacre. After the military left campus postmassacre, he was reinstated and served again as rector, passing away in 1971 at 56 years of age.
Discussion: University Presidents in the Maelstrom of Global Moral Panic
The four cases here all depict university administrators forced to navigate through the upheaval on their campuses, upheavals that pushed for fundamental change across scales: campus, city, nation, world. «Students are… challenging the whole fabric of present-day society», worried the UNESCO Division of Education Deputy Director, Jacques Bosquet. «[T]hey do not limit their demands to a few minor reforms, but call for a radical transformation» (Califano, 1970, 42) 8 . While some (like Stahr, Wells) maneuvered with less campus disintegration than others, all found themselves in a maelstrom of a kind of global moral panic. These educational leaders faced down what they believed to be a global social order coming un-glued. Across the board, they had been deeply imbricated in national and international governing bodies, institutions, and industries. As such, they had put their institutions at the service of these global projects, requiring institutional modernization: previously sites of solely elite reproduction, modern universities now required more and different kinds of students. Yet modernizing had a downside (Cohen & Frazier, 2015) : it germinated intermixing that they generated alliances across strata of social hierarchies. The menace of these alliances -made real in TV footage and newspaper headlines, images, and captions-confirmed not just that universities were sites of global connections, but that the prior social order was disintegrating. Indeed, their world was unraveling at every scale, from the most intimate of elites' own households (their sons and daughters were friends, and even romantically involved, with those outside their class and racial grouping) to the most far-reaching of neocolonial outposts and Cold War competition (e.g. Clemons & Jones, 1999; Ellis, 2014; Burkett, 2014 . Piccini, 2013 . University leaders manifested acute alarm at the intense multi-scaler conflicts of the late sixties.
Our use of the term global moral panic is in dialogue with historian Micol Seigel's assessment of the concept's utility; she led a multi-year, collaborative project on this theme only to disavow the global frame. Seigel retains moral panic, a term she credits U.K.-based scholars who used it to describe (1970s-80s) ideological projects garbed in public outrage. Fomented through the media, they intentionally «exacerbate [d] the underlying dispossession and reinforce[d] the victim-blaming, self-congratulatory rhetoric of contemporary global capitalism» (2018, 3) . Scholars Stanley Cohen and Stuart Hall, among others, had argued that moral panic discourses scapegoated urban youth-of-color (Rohloff and Wright, 2010; Thompson, 1998) , self-justified by up-swelling-outcry over violated social norms. Seigel posits that this ideological frame endures and perpetuates the idea of a racialized threat to social order; moreover, it has always invoked the global as the scale of the panic. Seigel then discards the possibility of global moral panic as an analytic tool: global is an ideological construct replicating the ruse at its core by erasing the transnational linkages that, more accurately in her view, describe often-in-play processes.
We, however, stake out a critical place for the term by providing the 1960s historical antecedents to its use in the 1970s-80s rampant-scapegoating. Indeed, Stanley Cohen reflected on the development of the concept in his dissertation, «written in 1967-69…[T]he term 'moral panics' very much belongs to the…late Sixties…distinctive voice» (2002, p. vi) . This background suggests to us that sixties moral panics laid the groundwork for a re-racialization of political struggle 9 , as movements across the globe met with overwhelming state force, and economic expansion ended (two decades of ensuing recessions), and many societies resegregated by race and class. As Stuart Hall's collaborator, Tony Jefferson (2008, p. 116) , reminds us, the scholarly concept of moral panic was used to periodize
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e-ISSN: 1698-7802 the postwar era: the sixties the climactic crisis and the denouement the resulting breakdown of hegemony. Hegemonic-breakdown required ideological-cleanup with a strong dose of moral panic.
But, is moral panic-as-ideology an instrumental ruse concocted by those in power? We take our cue from Hall's definition. Ideology, for Hall (1986, p. 29) , refers to «the mental-frameworks -the languages, concepts, categories, imagery of thought, and the systems of representation-which different classes and social groups deploy in order to make sense of, define, figure out and render intelligible the way society works». He identifies «the problem of ideology» as «the ways in which ideas of different kinds grip the minds of masses, and thereby become a 'material force» available for political projects. Actual affective states are intrinsic to political projects. Therefore, we need to take seriously the affective component of moral panic. Elites' genuine horror -panicked sense that the sky was falling, so to speak-in the sixties seems to have been the genesis for subsequent scapegoating.
Moreover, in the sixties, ideology was an emergent category, ubiquitouslyinvoked in cafes and on university campuses. Ideology had become an intrinsic commonsense category of the Cold War. The rise of moral panic as an ideological project at this juncture is about the slippage between the scholarly and ideological work of universities, much of it in writing about ideology. Sixties unrest incited a research-explosion on the nature of the conflicts works: supportive to movements (Aptheker, 1972; Bayer, Astin & Boruch, 1971; Bell & Kristol, 1968; Cockburn & Blackburn, 1969) ; on institutionality and higher education (U.S. President's, 1970; American Bar, 1972; Carnegie, 1971; Cox, 1968; Peterson & Bilorusky, 1970; Starks & Harris, 1971; Kerpelman, 1970; Brown, 1971) ; psychologizing (white) students as poorly-reared, poorly-mentored (by radical faculty), troubled youth (Bailey, 2002; Hendrick & Jones, 1969; Brickman & Lehrer, 1970; McGuigan, Payerle & Horrobin, 1968; Wilhelmsen, 1969) ; on violence, per se, much focused on black, urban activists (Waskow & Waskow, 1966; Fogelson, 1970; Gurr & Duvall, 1973) . Counterrevolutionary scholarship -recall Hook's comments quoted earlier-engaged in racialized-compartmentalization of activists, wherein, we posit, scholars may find beginnings of Seventies moral panics.
By not treating moral panic historically, scholars could inadvertently-replicate the delinking of scapegoats from the broader set of simultaneously allied and contending '68 sectors and struggles. Note not only the strength of the movements and the cross-sector alliances they generated, but also how this compoundedstrength horrified elites. That is, the work of (global) moral panic was not just an ideological ruse; rather, Sixties elites actually dreaded looming social breakdown. This social disintegration was the context from which came the additional ideological work required to produce the subsequent scapegoats.
In the case of university unrest, we detect this work in a two-fold response by those in power and their supporters to '68: first, the «psychologization» (Bailey, 2003) whom) their parents rejected; and second, the racialized «sociologization» that produced the urban black male (the 1970s scapegoat) dispossessed of the capacity to have political projects (i.e., no longer fighting for civil rights, instead, possessed by inchoate anger). That is, 1968 produced strong and problematic cross-sector alliances with their own contestatory globality, and so suffered the retaliatory wallingoff of «students», of «blacks», of other militant sectors. Global moral panic approximates the historical significance of 68: participants for and against the changes of the period saw themselves as operating at this global scale; moral panic is a theoretical concept emergent from the sixties; and the university leaders committed to modernization faced the unruly outcome by rallying global alliances to prevent (LSE, Columbia) or moderate (IU, UNAM) the undoing of the established social hierarchy. Both sixties elites and sectors that vehemently challenged them saw themselves operating on a global scale; they used that language at the time with particular, though not always congruent, understandings of the global, producing multiple globalities. These were not just differences in gradation, however, as IU and UNAM uniquely navigated otherwise similar structural conditions. Analysis on a global scale illuminates the differences between higher education administrators. While they were all on the hot seat, the conditions of possibility for addressing their crises were different.
Conclusion: Back on «the Hot Seat»
We have argued that global moral panic usefully describes the scaler predicaments and pressures brought to bear on top university administrators at flagship institutions of the midcentury capitalist system, and thus largely explains their actions to reign in this threat to the social order. Some (LSE, Columbia, and, at one point, IU) turned police violence against their own students, others (IU, UNAM) repeatedly (often to no avail) insisted that students and the state live up to the intellectual project of the university. Yet, for all, at stake in their campus rebellions was a global political order. Considering 1968 as a moment of global moral panic reveals the ways that global scale, understood in its historical specificity, has worked in relation to other multiple and changing scales, including the space of the campus and (neo)colonial empire, nation, region, urban centers, both metropole and provincial. These multiple scales were linked in a social order whose very constitutive terms were seen by elites as in danger of collapse. As intermediary authorities in this order, university presidents were on the hot seat.
We have charted the careers of elite university presidents, alongside a sketch of their campus' unrest. Their professional biographies evidence a revolving door between military/state, the university, and newly global non-governmental organizations (including entities affiliated with the United Nations), connections that established a fabric for a new ruling elite in post-war capitalist empire. Presidents and rectors, even at provincial and so-called third-world institutions (Plesch, 1981) , had global opportunities because of participation in World War II, empire, or antiimperialist alliances. Global opportunities continued on campuses that were expanding exponentially as sites of military efforts and modernizationist projects, creating a human and physical infrastructure in the Cold War context. And elites weren't wrong. The affective charge of understanding that the status quo was coming unglued produced a proto-ideological moral panic that was not, perhaps, so out of proportion to the challenge they faced, however out of proportion the resulting, overwhelming use of repressive discipline. Administrators, then, faced a mandate to simultaneously reproduce social hierarchies -principally in an elite groomed for global, regional, and national rule-and modernize their institutions by expanding en masse to wider swaths of young people with multiple, contestatory moral visions, with a combustible outcome. This outcome, in turn, put these leaders in the spotlight. They were encouraged, cajoled, and badgered through the media, and through official channels and public pressure in the form of private correspondence to reign in the situation; while at the same time, they faced virulent insults, demands, and confrontations from students themselves. Ultimately, these pressures meant that administrators faced a decision on whether or not to turn against students with a similar kind of force they had professionally known as part of the military in times of war (Stahr) , of the shadowy force of covert operations (Kirk, Cordier), or of police repression of groups subordinated by race, class, and nationality. Their inactions, as well as actions, taken against students were not contained to the campus but broadcast across the globe. To be further explored are the events and processes whereby media-amplified currents of elite outrage and apprehension were later forged into ideological tools and arch-types: the anti-imperialist red terrorist; the racialized urban criminal.
While also on the hot seat, administrators at non-metropole universities were in a different structural position, one where their university's global preeminence had to be established and could not be presumed. At Indiana University and Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México, administrators likewise embraced the national and global role of their institution but staked out a divergent path for that national and global mandate. They were men no less professionally formed in the ruling halls of power, yet in 1968, they helmed slightly-subordinate institutions in the capitalist world system -a provincial U.S. public flagship university and the public flagship university of a semi-peripheral state. At both campuses, administrators questioned the use of overwhelming police force as the solution to challenges by student activists 11 . Of necessity, they crafted different moral visions of the relation between elite universities and global polities. IU's Stahr and Wells asserted dual principles of racial inclusion and global exchange, while UNAM's Barros Sierra upheld the principle of university autonomy. Instead of global moral panic, these administrators acted on principals inherent in their understanding of the University itself.
To posit Global '68 as a precursor of the post-sixties global moral panics that justified state repression of insurgent sectors and a constriction of democratic participation, our piece has considered the cases of two elite institutions located in global metropoles, Columbia University, United States, and the London School of Economics (LSE), United Kingdom, and concludes with two non-metropole cases: a U.S. state flagship public university in a Midwestern city, Indiana University; and
